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Judicial Immunity and Sovereignty
By ROBERT F.

NAGEL*

Introduction
In a series of recent decisions, the Supreme Court has attempted to
settle several important questions regarding the availability of "official

immunity" as a defense to monetary liability in civil rights actions.
Legislative immunity has been restricted to those acts integral to the
"deliberative and communicative processes . . . with respect to the
consideration . . . of proposed legislation or . . . other matters . . .

within the jurisdiction of either House."' Executive immunity for most
federal2 and state3 officers has been qualified by the requirements that
the officers have a good faith belief in the constitutionality of their acts

and that reasonable grounds for such a belief exist.' In contrast, absolute judicial immunity-immunity for knowing and malicious unconstitutional acts-has been retained for all judicial acts except those
done in the clear absence of jurisdiction.'
These cases present the spectacle of the judiciary exposing virtu-

ally all other government officials to the threat of personal liability,
while carefully maintaining immunity for judges.6 The appearance of
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law. A.B., Swarthmore College, 1968; J.D., Yale University, 1972. The author expresses his appreciation to
Garrett M. White, third-year law student, for research assistance during the preparation of
this article.
1. This language was first used in a criminal case, Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S.
606, 625 (1972), but was later applied to the question of civil liability in Doe v. McMillan,
412 U.S. 306, 314 (1973). See also Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S.
491 (1975); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
2. Claims against federal officers are based on the Constitution itself. Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The
scope of official immunity in such cases was restricted in Butz v. Economou, 98 S. Ct. 2894
(1978).
3. Claims against state officers are based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). The Supreme
Court has defined the scope of official immunity in such cases. E.g., Imbler v. Pachtman,
424 U.S. 409 (1976); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Wood v. Strickland, 420
U.S. 308 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
4. See notes 2 & 3 supra.
5. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
6. Immunity for executives and judges is largely a judicially created doctrine, and the
constitutional immunity of legislators has been restricted by judicial interpretation. See
[2371
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institutional bias and self-protection is only heightened by the exception carved by the Court to the rule of qualified immunity for executive
officers: absolute immunity has been preserved for those officers whose
"special functions" require full protection from liability, and the touchstone for this determination appears to be the similarity or proximity of
certain executive functions to traditional judicial functions.7 The inference that the Justices have been influenced by unseemly self-interest
has elicited cynical asides from both commentators and jurists.8 The
special treatment afforded judges who act intentionally to deprive individuals of their constitutional rights deserves fuller and more serious
consideration.
Despite the decisive nature of the recent rulings, the law of official
immunity might be subject to significant changes in the future. Some
of the issues apparently settled authoritatively today have been decided
differently in the past. For a number of years, it appeared that no state
official could be absolutely immune from liability under section 1983 of
the Civil Rights Act. 9 In another period, many executive officials enjoyed virtually the same absolute immunity as is now enjoyed by
judges.' 0 At each turn, the justifications have been as serious and as
emphatically propounded as the reasons now given for the Court's
present position.
The theme of the following discussion is that the weighty policies
asserted by the Court in support of absolute judicial immunity do not
justify the result, but that the alternative explanation of institutional
self-interest does not fully explain the special status accorded the judicial function either. The significance of the Court's position on official
immunity can be found if the case law is viewed, as Thurman Arnold
Butz v. Economou, 98 S. Ct. 2894, 2909 (1978) and cases cited therein. See also Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 238-41 (1974).
7. See Butz v. Economou, 98 S. Ct. at 2912-16; Imbler v. Pachtrnan, 424 U.S. 409
(1976).
8. Professor Gray described the judge as "the pampered child of the law" and then
suggested that "[a] cynic might be forgiven for pointing out just who made this law." Gray,
Private Wrongs of PublicServants, 47 CAL. L. REv. 303, 309 (1959). See also Jennings, Tort
Liability ofAdministrative Officers, 21 MINN. L. REV. 263, 272 (1937). Justice Rehnquist is
one of the few judges to note the apparent partiality in the decisions. Butz v. Economou, 98
S. Ct. at 2917 n.* (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
9. The cases can be found in Davis, Administrative Officers' Tort Lzbility, 55 MICH. L.
REV. 201, 228-29 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Davis]. For the modem law on state officials'
immunity, see cases cited in note 3 supra.
10. The highpoint of executive immunity is represented by Judge Learned Hand's opinion in Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949). See also Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564
(1959) and cases cited therein at 572 n.9; Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896). The modem
approach to executive officials' immunity is illustrated by the cases cited in note 2 supra.
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suggested, as an important set of social symbols whose function is "not
so much to guide society, as to comfort it."II The case law illuminates
less about the social policies asserted for judicial immunity or the
self-protective instincts of judges than about the persistence and importance of the idea of sovereignty.
If the symbolic objectives underlying the special status of the judicial function are forthrightly examined, that status will be understood
to be unnecessary and destructive. The next shift in the case law
should be to qualify judicial immunity in civil rights cases."
I.

Asserted Justifications for the Special Status of the
Judicial Function

A.

The Special Status

In Stump v. Sparkman, 2 the Supreme Court chose an extreme
factual situation to reaffirm that judges are absolutely immune from
liability for unconstitutional judicial acts committed under color of
their jurisdiction. Judge Stump was alleged to have deprived a
fifteen-year-old girl of her right to due process of law when he approved her mother's petition for permission to sterilize the girl. The
petition stated in conclusory terms that the daughter was "somewhat
retarded," that she had been associating with young men, and that sterilization would be in her best interests "to prevent unfortunate circumstances."13 The petition was neither given a docket number nor filed
with the clerk's office. It was approved in an exparte proceeding of
which the daughter was not notified, no guardian ad litem was appointed for the daughter, and no hearing was held.' 4 The daughter did
not discover the nature of the operation performed on her until two
years later, after she had married and had attempted to have children. 15
The Supreme Court treated these facts as essentially irrelevant to
the issue of immunity. The opinion first summarized the existing law
and found that a judge would not be liable unless his acts were clearly
beyond his jurisdiction or were not judicial in nature.' 6 It concluded
11. T. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 34 (1935) [hereinafter cited as
ARNOLD].

12. 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
13. Id. at 351.
14. Id. at 360. The court of appeals summarized these actions by saying that the judge
had not taken "the slightest steps to ensure that [the minor's] rights were protected." Sparkman v. McFarlin, 552 F.2d 172, 176 (7th Cir. 1977).
15. 435 U.S. at 353.
16. Id. at 356-57.
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that Judge Stump's acts were not clearly beyond his jurisdiction because by statute he had "original exclusive jurisdiction in all cases at
law and equity whatsoever," and because no statute or decision prohibited such a court of general jurisdiction "from considering a petition of
the type presented to Judge Stump."' 7 The fact that the order may
have been illegal under state law did not deprive the judge of jurisdiction, 8 nor did the fact that the method by which he reached his decision may have been unconstitutional. 9 Finally, the Court rejected the
claim that the judge's actions were non-judicial. The acts were judicial

because the judge's function was one "normally performed by a judge"
and because the mother had dealt with Judge Stump with the expecta-

tion that he was acting in his judicial capacity.20 Accordingly, Judge
Stump was held to be immune no matter how malicious his motive for
17. Id. at 357-58. No statute specifically authorized a court to order a sterilization, but
Indiana statutes did authorize parents to "consent to ... medical or hospital care or treatment of [the minor] including surgery." Id. at 358. The Court reasoned that the general
jurisdictional grant and the absence of any specific withdrawal of jurisdiction over sterilization decisions amounted to sufficient subject matter jurisdiction to permit the court to consider whether to approve the parental decision. Id. The Court noted that Indiana courts
had been specifically authorized to order sterilization of institutionalized individuals under
certain circumstances, but did not find this narrow authorization to constitute an implied
limitation on the court's general jurisdiction. Id. It is at least questionable whether the
Court would have altered its conclusion even had there existed a specific statute withdrawing jurisdiction over sterilization orders of non-institutionalized minors. Cf.United States
v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947) (federal courts have jurisdiction to consider
whether they have jurisdiction over certain labor disputes despite a statute removing jurisdiction concerning issuance of restraining orders in cases arising out of labor disputes). See
Dobbs, The Validation of Void Judgments: The Bootstrap Princile,53 VA. L. Rav. 1003,
1020 (1967).
18. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 358-59. The Indiana Court of Appeals had previously held that a parent did not have a common law right to have a minor child sterilized in
A.L. v. G.R.H., 325 N.E.2d 501 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 936 (1970). But the Supreme
Court distinguished between the absence of jurisdiction and an illegal decision on the merits
concerning an issue over which a court does have jurisdiction. This distinction has a long
but not uncontradicted history. Compare Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351-53
(1871) (distinguishing an act in excess of jurisdiction from an act in the clear absence of
jurisdiction) with Cooper v. Reynolds, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 308, 316-17 (1870) (jurisdiction
defined in part by "the authority of the court to render the judgment or decree which it
assumes to make"). See also Duba v. McIntyre, 501 F.2d 590, 592 (8th Cir. 1974) (jurisdiction requires inquiry into "whether the defendant's action is authorized by any set of conditions or circumstances"). The question whether this distinction is at all relevant to the issue
of civil rights liability is discussed infra. See notes 76-84 and accompanying text infra.
19. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 358-59.
20. Id. at 362-63. The use of the term "normal" was certainly strained inasmuch as it
suggests that normal judicial functions include the use of unconstitutional procedures and
the issuance of illegal orders. By "normal," the Court was actually referring to the business
of entertaining petitions relating to the affairs of minors, where there is at least colorable
jurisdiction. See text accompanying notes 25-27 infra.
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the sterilization order might have been and regardless of how obvious
the illegality of his acts should have been to him. The Court justified
this broad rule of immunity with a reference to the need for a judge to

act "upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences," and with a remark about the difficulty of the judge's duties
and his "painful sense of responsibility."'"

In contrast to its approach to judicial immunity, and without regard for the difficulty of their decisions or the painfulness of their
senses of responsibility, the Court has recently and emphatically declined to provide similarly broad immunity to most executive officers.22
Such officers can be liable even if their acts were colorably within their
statutory authorization and clearly "executive" in nature.23 For execu-

tive functions, immunity is triggered not by jurisdictional or generic
concepts but by the existence of a reasonably-based, good faith belief

that the action was constitutional.2"
Less obvious, perhaps, is the fact that absolute judicial immunity
also appears to be broader than the "absolute" immunity granted to
legislators. Both judges and legislators are absolutely immune only for
acts done within the judicial or legislative spheres, respectively. But the
scope of this immunity is, in fact, broader for judges because the
method of defining the judicial function has been less restrictive. In
Slump, the Court explicitly defined the judicial function largely ac-

cording to what is "normally" done by a judge.2 1 Judge Stump's actions were described as "normal" because he had at least colorable
jurisdiction and because "judges normally entertain petitions with respect to the affairs of minors."' 26 The Court expressly denied that any
21. Id. at 363-64 (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wail.) 335, 347, 348 (1871)).
22. See cases cited in notes 3 & 7 supra.
23. See cases cited in notes 3 & 7 supra. The fact that a decision is "executive" in the
sense of being highly discretionary can be a factor in determining whether a reasonable,
good-faith belief of legality existed, but it does not necessarily bar liability. See note 24
infra.
24. "These considerations suggest that, in varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of government, the variation being dependent upon
the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they
reasonably appeared at the time of the action. . . . It is the existence of reasonable grounds
for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with
good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity of executive officers .... "
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974). For discussions of what this standard
means, see Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 330-31 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting); Yudoff,
Liabilitfyor ConstitutionalTorts and the Risk-Averse Public School Official, 49 S. CAL. L.
Rnv. 1322 (1976), [hereinafter cited as Yudof]; Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and
Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1133, 1204 passim (1977).
25. 435 U.S. at 362-63.
26. Id at 362 n.ll.
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illegality in the judge's procedures vitiated the judicial nature of his
acts. 27 The Court thus defined "judicial" by a formalistic inquiry into
whether a normal "case" was presented, not according to the normalcy
or legality of the methods used to resolve the case.
A different approach to defining the legislative function was taken
in Gravel v. United States,z8 in which the Court held that legislative
immunity does not extend to the private publication of classified materials used by a Senate subcommittee. Although senators "normally"
communicate with their constituents about governmental affairs, and
although this informing function is important to their duties as representatives,2 9 the Court explained: "That Senators generally perform
certain acts in their official capacity. . . does not necessarily make all
such acts legislative in nature."3 In addition to the informing function,
the Court has identified traditional legislative efforts to lobby the executive branch and the deliberative process leading up to a vote as functions normally performed by a legislator that are not necessarily
"legislative."' Such acts are defined as outside the legislative sphere
when they are unnecessary to the "due functioning" of the legislative
32 Of
branch or are inconsistent with the integrity of that process.
course, the illegality of the act is a prime determinant of whether it is
necessary to the due functioning of the legislature. Bribes, for example,
"gravely undermine legislative integrity and defeat the right of the publeglic to honest representation," thus endangering the integrity of the
33
protect.
to
designed
is
immunity
legislative
that
islative process
The Court's method of defining the legislative function is plainly
inconsistent with the method used in Stump to define the judicial function.34 If Stump had been analyzed consistently with the legislative im27. Id. at 359-61.
28. 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
29. Id. at 636 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 625.
31. See United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972) (accepting money prior to a
vote); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966) (lobbying the executive branch). These
cases represent a departure from the highly formalistic method used to define "legislative
act" in Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951). In Tenney, the Court held that investigative committees were within the sphere of protected legislative activity because such investigations were an "established part" of the legislative process. The Court also held that such
committees exceeded the legislative sphere only when usurping the powers of one of the
other branches of government. Id. at 377-78.
32. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972); United States v. Brewster, 408
U.S. 501, 524-25 (1972).
33. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. at 524-25.
34. Some of the more recent cases narrowing the "legislative sphere" have involved
criminal liability, rather than civil damages. It might be conjectured that considerations
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munity cases, the Court would not have stopped at describing the
matter before Judge Stump as a case "normally" handled by a judge. It
would have further inquired whether the procedures used in handling
the "case" were necessary to the "due functioning" of the judicial
branch. Two factors relevant to this determination would have been
whether the procedures were illegal and whether they undermined the
integrity of the judge's deliberative process. 3 A bribe undermines the
integrity of the legislative process by exposing the legislator to improper, irrelevant influences; such exposure is not a part of the legislative process despite its close connection to the core of the legislative
process, the act of voting. 6 If so, it is at least worth inquiry whether an
ex pare proceeding involving the decision to sterilize an unnotified
and unrepresented minor undermines the integrity of the judicial process to the extent that such procedures cannot fairly be called judicial
acts despite their close connection to judging a case.37
unique to the criminal context justify narrowing immunity; this possibility is consistent with
the criminal liability of judges under 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1976). However, the Court has used
identical language in defining "legislative sphere" in both criminal and civil cases. See note
1 supra. The implication is strong, therefore, that a legislator could be found civilly liable
for his personal acts, e.g., communicating with his constituents about an issue of public
importance, despite the fact that formally the acts were a normal part of the legislator's
duties. Cf. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973) (liability for invasion of privacy may be
imposed on distributors of information even if they were acting under congressional authorization); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972) (no legislative immunity from testifying
before a grand jury regarding possible criminal conduct involving the actual distribution of
information).
35. See notes 32 & 33 and accompanying text supra.
36. In United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972), the Court asserted that a bribe
could be prosecuted without inquiry into any legislative act or the motivation for such act.
Id. at 526. Nevertheless, the close connection between the bribe and the vote, as well as
between the bribe and other more legitimate influences, is apparent. See id. at 556-60
(White, J., dissenting).
37. Thus a possible reform of the law of judicial immunity might retain "absolute"
immunity, yet restrict it by defining "judicial act" in the same way that "legislative act" has
been defined. The analogy to legislative immunity suggests that a judicial order or judgment
on the merits would be as immune as a legislative vote. In Stump, liability might flow from
the judge's motives or procedures (if, for example, he had taken a bribe or flipped a coin in
order to decide the case), but not from the issuance of the sterilization order (regardless of its
illegality). Cf. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973) (immunity provided for the legislative
vote to distribute private information, but not for the distribution itself); United States v.
Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972) (immunity provided for the actual vote, but not for the bribe
preceeding it). Measuring damages for acts other than the order itself would raise difficult
problems of a nature already being dealt with in cases where executives are alleged to have
committed procedural errors. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978); Codd v. Velger, 429
U.S. 624 (1977).
Although analogizing judicial immunity to legislative immunity would be preferable to
retaining the present law of judicial immunity, the better reform would be to analogize judicial immunity to executive immunity, where the executive nature of the act does not immu-
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The Court has narrowed legislative immunity by injecting a normative factor into the definition of the legislative function. Notions of
both jurisdiction and generic function have been made largely irrelevant to the issue of immunity for malicious acts of those exercising the
executive function. In defining the immunity of judges, however, the
Court has been entirely formalistic. The next section explores the reasons the Court has given for the special status it has thus created for the
immunity of those exercising the judicial function.
B. The Justifications
The Court has insisted that the extent of absolute immunity afforded those exercising the judicial function does not result from
judges' status or their location within the government, but from "the
special nature of their responsibilities."3 The Court's analysis has
been determinedly functional; inquiry has focused on "the immunity
historically accorded the relevant official at common law and the interests behind it."3 9 However, the justifications asserted for the judiciary's
special protection do not persuasively distinguish the judicial function
from the executive and legislative functions; indeed, many of these justifications point persuasively to the special appropriateness of
qualiingthe immunity of judges. The Court's analysis of the special
needs of the judicial function is so unsatisfactory that it is necessary to
look to entirely different reasons for an understanding of the basis for
judicial immunity.
1. As contrastedto the legislativefunction
Because legislative immunity is narrower than judicial immunity
only in the unobvious sense that the Court has injected normative factors into the definition of "legislative function,"4 the Court has neither
openly acknowledged nor explained the differences between the scope
nize the executive for knowingly unconstitutional behavior. See notes 38-85 and
accompanying text infra. Under this analogy, if Judge Stump's judgment and order were
knowingly unconstitutional, he would not be immune despite the formally judicial nature of
these acts. At any rate, the point here is merely that even if the appropriate analogy were
between legislative and judicial immunity, the present law of judicial immunity would still
not be justified because the Court has used a more formalistic method for defining judicial
acts than for defining legislative acts.
38. Butz v. Economou, 98 S. Ct. at 2913. Cf. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S 349 (1978).
The emphasis on function is apparent in all of the recent immunity cases. As to the legislative function, see cases cited in note 1 supra. With respect to the executive function, see
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
39. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. at 421.
40. See notes 28-33 and accompanying text supra.
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of legislative and judicial immunity. The bases for judicial immunity
are quite different from those of legislative immunity; these differences
justify broader, more careful protection for legislators than for judges.
At the federal level, legislative immunity is founded on constitutional text.41 At the state level, legislative immunity is also constitutionally based to the extent that at least the rudiments of separation of
powers principles must be protected from federal interference. 42 Even

if not technically based on constitutional text, legislative immunity at
the state level serves the same policies that are of constitutional magnitude at the federal level. In contrast, judicial immunity, whether at the
federal or state level, is court-made law of somewhat mysterious origins.43 Accordingly, the legal issues involved in determining the proper
scope of immunity in civil rights actions are entirely different as be-

tween the two types of immunity. With legislative immunity, two policies of constitutional importance-legislative independence and the

individual's substantive rights-must be accommodated. With judicial
immunity, the protection of the individuals constitutional rights is limited only by common law principles designed to protect the smooth

functioning of a governmental institution.
The constitutional policies that underlie legislative immunity re-

late to the most fundamental principles of republican government.44
41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6 provides, in part, that Senators and Representatives "shall in
all cases, except treason, felony and breach of peace, be privileged from arrest during their
attendance at the session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the
same; and for any speech or debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any
other place."
42. See Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of FederalEquitable Remedies, 30
STAN. L. REy. 661, 667-68 (1978). See also note 60 infra.
43. It is conceivable that a statute might expose judges to a risk of liability in such a way
as to interfere with the article III judicial power as a constitutional matter. However, such a
claim would seem to be especially inappropriate with regard to qualified civil rights liability.
See note 49 and text accompanying notes 46-53 and 87-116 infra. Cf.United States v.
Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146-47 (1871) (article III power infringed by a jurisdictional
statute that "prescribed a rule for the decision of a cause in a particular way"). At any rate,
the Court has not suggested that judicial immunity is derived from article III. For judicial
explanations of the origins of judicial immunity, see cases cited in note 6 supra. For academic discussions of the derivation of official immunity from sovereign immunity, see material cited in note 65 infra. The reference in the text to "mystery" is from Jaffe, SuitsAgainst
Governments and Officers: DamageActions, 77 HARV. L. REV.209 (1963). Among the mysteries are: How did judges become clothed with the immunity of the crown when some other
officers of the crown did not? Why did a doctrine rooted in monarchy survive the American
Revolution? How has such a doctrine survived the general decline in the idea of sovereignty? How has judicial immunity survived the inclusive language of the Civil Rights Act
of 1871? In addition to the material referred to above, see LASKI, FOUNDATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY 137passim (1921) and material cited in note 66 infra.
44. For a discussion of the significance that the framers attached to the idea of separa-
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As the Court has acknowledged:
[Legislative immunity] was the culmination of a long struggle for
parliamentary supremacy. Behind these simple phrases lies a history of conflict between the Commons and the Tudor and Stuart
monarchs during which successive monarchs utilized the criminal
and civil law to suppress and intimidate critical legislators. Since
the Glorious Revolution in Britain, and throughout United States
history, the privilege has been recognized as an important protection of the independence and integrity of the legislature."
The Court has consistently stated that judicial immunity also protects
independence and integrity,16 but the purposes of legislative and judicial immunity are not coordinate. Legislative immunity is embodied in
constitutional text in order to protect the independence of the legislature from the excesses of the other branches of government. Whether
the intimidation arises from criminal actions initiated by the executive
branch or from civil actions harnessing the "potentially hostile" power
of the judicial branch, the protections are against incursions by the
other branches of government.4 7 Legislative immunity protects the basic constitutional structure of separation of powers. It reflects the framers' pessimistic assumption that "power is of an encroaching nature and
. . . ought to be effectively restrained from passing the limits assigned
to it."4 In contrast, judicial immunity protects against the threat posed
by individual citizens who can injure the judicial function only if the
courts are unable or unwilling to protect themselves.4 9
The Court has minimized the external dangers to the legislature
that the framers took seriously enought to guard against in the Constitution. Thus, the classic threat of unjustified criminal prosecutions by
the executive against legislators has been described by the Court as "retion of powers, see J. MADISON, THE FEDERALIST No. 47, 48 (C. Beard ed. 1959); M. VILE,
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 119-75 (1967);

G. WOOD, THE

CRE-

ATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 (1969).

45. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 178 (1966), quotedin United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 507-08 (1972).
46. The need for independent judicial judgment is emphasized in Stump v. Sparkman,
435 U.S. 349, 354-56 (1978), and in Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall,) 335, 347 (1871).
47. Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 502-03 (1975).
48. J. MADISON, THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 217 (C. Beard ed. 1959). See also material
cited in note 37 supra.
49. In a more remote sense, a liability statute, like a jurisdictional statute, might be
thought to present a legislative threat to judicial power. But section 1983 is a liability statute
with general applicability that is capable of being interpreted as imposing only limited liability on judges, and that is ameliorated by the power ofjudges to rule on the pleadings and
evidence in particular cases. Therefore, any "threat" inherent in such a statute is surely
different from the kinds of specific intimidations and interferences against which legislative
immunity and separation of powers were intended to protect. See note 43 supra.
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mote," although not "discounted entirely."5 In fact, the Court has
turned the framers' assumptions upside down by pointing to the protections afforded by the judiciary as one reason for minimizing the possibility of interference with the legislative process." The Court has
pointed to such judicial protections despite the fact that the legislative
process can be and has been interrupted and frustrated for years by
citizens' use of the judicial process. 52 At the same time, the Court has
taken seriously ihe "danger" that the judiciary, somehow adequately
able and motivated to protect Congress from the executive, is unable to
protect itself from suits by individual citizens. The possibility that the
judiciary might be sufficiently "alert to the possibilities of artful pleading" to protect itself by terminating "insubstantial lawsuits" has never
been found a sufficient reason to open judges to the threat of suits for
their malicious acts. 3
The constitutional status of legislative immunity not only undermines the Court's apparent assessment of the relative importance of the
interests involved in cases of legislative and judicial immunity, but also
casts substantial doubt on its construction of the Civil Rights Act of
1871.11 In Tenney v. Brandhove,55 the Court held that the framers of
section 1983 could not have intended by their general language to impinge on legislative immunity because that doctrine was "so well
56
grounded in history and reason" at the time the statute was drafted.
Later, in Pierson v. Ray,5 7 the Court purported to rely on the same
reasoning in carving out judicial immunity from the reach of the Civil
Rights Act:
The legislative record gives no clear indication that Congress intended to abolish wholesale all common law immunities.
Accordingly, this Court held in Tenney v. Brandhove, that the im50. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 524 (1972).
51. Id. at 522 n.16. Cf. text accompanying note 47 supra.
52. During the litigation culminating in Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund,
421 U.S. 491 (1975), courts enjoined the enforcement of a subpoena of the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security for five years, despite the fact that the subpoena was ultimately
found to be valid. Id. at 511 n. 17. The subpoena was directed at bank records of an organization that provided various services to members of the armed forces; thus, the delay affected an inquiry into a subject of at least potential national importance.
53. Butz v. Economou, 98 S. Ct. at 2911. The prohibitive factor cannot be the impossibility of identifying an insubstantial suit on the basis of the pleadings, since the Court has
said that the judiciary is capable of such discriminations with regard to suits against executives. Id.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
55. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
56. Id. at 376.
57. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
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munity of legislators for acts within the legislative role was not
abolished. The immunity of judges for acts within the judicial
role is equally well established . . 58
Despite this language, it was not a mere common law immunity which
the Tenney Court had presumed to be unaffected by congressional action. It was, as the opinion explained at length, a tradition "carefully
preserved in the formation of the State and National Governments."5 9
Clearly, it is appropriate to require affirmative and persuasive proof
that Congress intended to limit a principle, such as legislative immunity, thought to have constitutional significance. The avoidance of
difficult constitutional questions and the presumption that legislation is
constitutional are accepted canons. 60 The same requirement is not at
all appropriate when "Congress enacts a statute to remedy the inadequacies of the pre-existing law, including the common law,"' 6' and
common law is the basis for judicial immunity.
The broader protection afforded by the Court to judicial immunity, compared to legislative immunity, is thus inconsistent with the
constitutional status of the policies underlying legislative immunity and
with normal principles of statutory construction. Nor can the relative
narrowing of legislative immunity be justified on the basis that inquiries into judicial conduct are more difficult than those relating to legislative action. It would seem more feasible to examine and evaluate the
knowledge and behavior of a single judge than to attempt a similar
inquiry into the behavior of perhaps hundreds of legislators.6 2 Judges
normally act on the basis of information provided in a record and with
respect to a single, identified case. Legislators act on the basis of
knowledge gained on public streets and in private cloakrooms; they act
not to decide a single case but to accommodate competing, on-going
interests. Such practical considerations favor a broader rule of immunity for legislators than for judges.
The narrower area of legislative immunity might be thought to be
harmless, since-under the Court's formulation-legislators can be liable only for acts that do not promote the proper functioning of the
legislature. 63 Even assuming that there are only minimal dangers in
58. Id. at 554 (emphasis added).
59. 341 U.S. at 376.
60. The Court assumed that the abolition of even state legislative immunity would present a difficult constitutional question. Id.
61. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. at 561 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
62. See Developments in the Lan-Section 1983 andFederalism,90 H xRv. L. Rav. 1133,
1200 (1977).
63. See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
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entrusting to courts the determination as to what is necessary for proper
legislating,' the broader, formalistic conception of the "judicial function" is not justified. Courts are better qualified to decide at what point
procedures become so unfair and so illegal as not to promote the due
functioning of the judiciary than they are qualified to determine, for
example, what influences are proper for a legislative vote or how a legislator should communicate with his constituents. To the extent that
the normative definition of "legislative function" is harmless or even
beneficial, the Court should utilize normative factors even more liberally in defining "judicial function".
2 As contrastedto the executivefunction.
Both judicial and executive immunity are common law doctrines
with a similar origin in the monarchical concept of sovereign immunity. 5 Despite the Court's unwillingness to presume that the framers
of section 1983 intended to alter the common law so as to expose judges
to liability, there is persuasive evidence that the legislative intent was to
expose both executives and judges to liability.66 More importantly, the
same reasons given for judicial immunity have long been used to justify
executive immunity. 67 It might have been expected, therefore, that as
the modem Court determined that the policies behind official immunity did not require that executives be immune for their knowingly unconstitutional acts, the same conclusion would soon have followed with
respect to judicial immunity. If exposure to limited liability would not
lead to unacceptably timid executive decisions, why should it be
thought to threaten independent judicial decisions? If limited executive
liability is not grossly unfair in penalizing an officer for making the
difficult decisions he was hired to make, why would limited judicial
liability be unfair? If able executive officers would not be deterrred
64. This is a dubious assumption. See, e.g., United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 551
(1972) (White, J., dissenting). Decisions restricting communications between legislator and
constituent especially interject the judiciary into the heart of the democratic process. See
Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 136 (1966) (legislators' functions include controversial communications "so that their constituents can be fully informed."); W. WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL
GOVERNMENT 303 (1885).
65. See Gray, Private Wrongs of Public Servants, 47 CAL. L. REV. 303 (1959); Jaffe,
SuitsAgainst Governments and Officers: DamageActions, 77 HARV. L. REV. 209 (1963); Jennings, Tort Liability ofAdministrative Officers, 21 MINN. L. REV. 263 (1937); Note QuasiJudicialImmunigy: Its Scope and Limitationsin Section 1983 Actions, 1976 DUKE L. J. 95
(1976).
66. Kates, Immunity of State Judges under the Federal Civil Rights Acts: Pierson v. Ray
Reconsidered,65 Nw. L. REV. 615 (1970); Note, Liability of JudicialOfficers Under Section
1983, 79 YALE L. J. 322 (1969).
67. See, e.g., Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1895).
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from entering public service by the threat of liability, why would potential judges be deterred? The Court, however, has continued to describe
absolute immunity as essential to the judicial function, while rejecting
this conclusion as to the executive function. The difference has been
justified on the grounds that absolute executive immunity was not as
firmly established in the common law, and that the judicial function
has special attributes making even limited liability incompatible with
its proper functioning.
a.

The Common Law.

In Butz v. Economou,68 the Court examined the major executive
immunity cases and found that none of the American cases presented
the issue of immunity for acts "manifestly beyond [the] line of duty," or
for acts that "exceeded constitutional limits."6 9 In contrast, the Court
has repeatedly described absolute judicial immunity as firmly established at common law.70 This reliance on the common law is inadequate to justify the special status of the judicial function for a number
of reasons. First, the place of absolute judicial immunity in the common law is not as unambiguous as the Court has indicated. When section 1983 was enacted, the major Supreme Court decision on judicial
immunity had suggested that judges might be liable for acts done maliciously and in excess of jurisdiction.7 State law in a significant
number of jurisdictions either was uncertain or favored qualified judicial immunity.7 2 Even the English common law qualified the immunity
of magistrates and other courts of limited jurisdiction.7 3 Secondly,
even assuming that absolute judicial immunity was unambiguously established at common law, the appropriate objective is not merely to
perpetuate historical distinctions, but to assess and implement the interests behind those distinctions.74 The executive immunity cases ex68. 98 S. Ct. 2894 (1978).
69. Id. at 2905.
70. See Butz v. Economou, 98 St. Ct. at 2910-12; Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355
(1978); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1871).
71. Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. 523 (1868). Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335
(1871), the decision establishing absolute judicial immunity, was decided a year after the
enactment of section 1983. See Note, Liabiliy of JudicialOfficers under Section 1983, 79
YALE L. J. 322, 325 (1969).
72. Note, LiabilityofJudicialOfficers underSection 1983, 79 YALE L. J. 322, 326 & n.29,
327 & nn.30-32 (1969).
73. Id. at 325 & n.25. See also Brazier, JudicialImmunity and the Independence of the
Judiciary, 1976 PUB. L. 397.
74. In general, the Court has attempted to do so. See Butz v. Economou, 98 S. Ct. at
2910-12. See also cases cited in notes I & 38 supra.
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amined in Butz plainly were efforts to apply to executive functions the
same policy considerations that were thought to justify judicial immunity.75 Therefore, to the extent that these cases did not establish absolute executive immunity, they should direct inquiry to the question of
whether the common law identified special attributes of the judicial
function that would persuasively support perpetuating absolutejudicial
immunity. Without such an explanation, the executive immunity
cases-to the extent that they do not establish that absolute executive
immunity was thought to be necessary at common law-undercut the
significance of the existence in the common law of absolute judicial

immunity.
The final problem with the Court's reliance on the common law is
that the rationales underlying the older cases establishing absolute judicial immunity are not entirely inconsistent with modem standards that
qualify executive immunity. In the main case relied on to establish
absolute judicial immunity, Bradley v. Fisher,7 6 the Court held that a
judge would not be immune for an illegal act if the act were in the
"clear absence of all jurisdiction." 77 The Bradley Court distinguished
such acts from acts done merely "in excess of jurisdiction" and from
'78
challenges to the "manner in which. . . jurisdiction was exercised.
For example, if a probate court were to sentence a felon, its act would
be in the clear absence of jurisdiction; if a criminal court were to sentence a felon to an excessive term, its act would be in excess ofjurisdiction; and if a criminal court were to violate principles of due process in
trying a felon, its act would involve the manner in which jurisdiction
was exercised. 7 9 The Court limited potential liability to the first of
these three categories because, "where jurisdiction over the subject-matter is invested by law in the judge. . . the manner and extent
in which the jurisdiction shall be exercised are generally as much questions for his determination as any other questions involved in the case
75. E.g., Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 569-74 (1959); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483
(1896) (after summnarizing cases dealing with judicial immunity, the Court stated, "We are of
opinion [sic] that the same general considerations of public policy and convenience which
demand for judges ... immunity from civil suits .. , apply to a large extent to ... heads
of Executive Departments ....") Id. at 498.
76. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
77. Id. at 351-52.
78. Id. at 351-53, 357 (Davis, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 352. The Court did not specifically state that violations of due process involved only the manner in which jurisdiction was exercised. The Court did, however,
clearly treat the procedural irregularities as illegal, ascribing this to "natural justice" rather
than to the Constitution. Id. at 354.
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,"I The difficulty is, of course, that subject-matter jurisdiction
...
normally is as much a question of law for the court as are the manner
and extent of the exercise of that jurisdiction.8 A court must decide
whether it has the authority to try a felon just as it must decide what
procedures it must follow and what sentence it may impose. Obviously, the three categories all identify illegal use of authority, the differences pointing largely to the degree of error.8 2
The Bradley Court's terminology was an effort to identify the kind
or degree of illegality for which judges should not be immune. To categorize an act as being in the "clear absence of jurisdiction" does not
explain why this type of misuse of authority should expose a judge to
liability while the other unauthorized acts do not, except to suggest that
liability should depend in part on the obviousness of the mistake of
law. Indeed, the Bradley Court made quite explicit its reasons for exposing judges to liability for acts done in the clear absence of jurisdiction: "Where there is clearly no jurisdiction . . . any authority
exercised is a usurped authority, and for the exercise of such authority,
when the want ofjurisdictionis known to the judge, no excuse is permissible."8 3 The Court added that if a probate court were to try a criminal
case, the judge would not be immune, the usurpation of authority "being necessarily known to [the] judge."'84 The Court made no effort to
explain why a clear violation of due process might not be as necessarily
known to a judge as a mistake relating to subject matter jurisdiction.
The utilization of the common law rules in Bradley was therefore an
effort to identify those judicial mistakes that must have been knowingly
made. The fact that the categories employed for this purpose were inadequate should not obscure the premise: there should be no immunity
for errors that must have been knowing.
Thus, the rationale underlying the common law exception to judicial immunity can readily be accommodated to the modem standard of
qualified immunity. Executives are not immune for acts that they knew
or should have known violated clear constitutional standards. 85 The
80. Id. at 352.
81. Cf. Dobbs, The Validation of Void Judgements: The Bootstrap Princole, 53 VA. L.
REv. 1003 (1967) (analyzing the rule that, once a court has determined it has jurisdiction,
that decision is resjudicataand is not subject to collateral attack).
82. With regard to executive actions, the Court has treated as unauthorized acts that
were unconstitutional but within statutory authority. See Butz v. Economou, 98 S. Ct. at
2902-04. Analogously, a judicial act that is within a court's subject matter jurisdiction
should not be considered authorized if it is unconstitutional.
83. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351-52 (1871) (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 352 (emphasis added).
85. See notes 2-4 and accompanying text supra.
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common law held judges liable for a subclass of similarly unreasonable
mistakes of law by labeling them in the "clear absence of jurisdiction."
The appropriate task for the Court today is not a mechanical application of the categories used in Bradley to identify such mistakes, but a
reasoned examination of the apparent inadequacy of those categories
for achieving their purpose. The place of judicial immunity in the
common law merely emphasizes the importance of a careful analysis of
the judicial function to determine whether it has any special attributes
incompatible with broader liability rules.
b. Special Attributes of the Judicial Function.
Two judicial attributes have been asserted as justifications for a
broad rule of immunity. The first, relating generally to the "dignity" of
a court, was used frequently in the past but is not relied on in modem
opinions and is discussed in the second section of this article.8 6 The
second, to be discussed in this section, relates to the special purposes
and procedures of the judiciary and is heavily relied on today. Upon
examination, however, these attributes more persuasively support qualified than absolute judicial immunity.
The major reasons given today for judicial immunity are: that judicial decisions are particularly difficult decisions, so that it would be
expecially unfair to expose a judge to liability for making precisely the
kinds of hard judgments that it is his legal obligation to make;8 7 that
judicial decisions must be made entirely independently of personal
considerations, including the fear of personal liability; 8 and that deterrence of illegal conduct, the major purpose of civil rights liability, is
implicated less by judicial functions because judges are relatively unlikely, due to their training, traditions and the self-correcting characteristics of the adversary process, to act unconstitutionally.8 9 Buttressing
each of these arguments is the claim that because judicial decisions nec86. See notes 119-30 and accompanying text infra.
87. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 364 (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
335, 347 (1871) to the effect that difficult cases impose on judges "the severest labor"). Justice Douglas's characterization of the judical decision is typical: "The judicial function involves an informed exercise of judgment. It is often necessary to choose between differing
versions of fact, to reconcile opposing interests, and to decide closely contested issues. Decisions must often be made in the heat of trial. A vigorous and independent mind is needed to
perform such delicate tasks." Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 566 (1967) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
88. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 363 (quoting Bradley for the proposition that "[the]
judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, [must be] free to act upon his own
convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself').
89. Butz v. Economou, 98 S. Ct. at 2913-16.
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essarily involve matters that excite antagonism, and because lawsuits
end with one party losing, the threat of numerous suits is great. 90 Thus,
even the possibility of liability only for unreasonable or knowing deprivations of constitutional rights would undermine the functions performed by judges.
Despite the real consternation that legal disputes cause judges, and
despite the highly focused intellectual attention that their decisions receive in law schools, there is no obvious reason to believe that the decisions of judges are more difficult than those of many executive officers.
The policeman on the street must "[decide questions] that may later
divide an appellate court."'" The same can be said of governors who
must decide whether to call out the militia, and of superintendents of
mental hospitals who must decide whether to release a patient.9 z Even
a cursory view of the difficulty of executive decision-making supports
Justice Rehnquist's suggestion that the special status of judicial immunity is based on the judiciary's special sensitivity to its own problems.9 3
In fact, it is probably far more realistic to expect a judge to avoid
an unreasonable or knowing violation of constitutional rights than an
executive officer. Civil rights liability standards for executives turn essentially on knowledge of the law.94 Executives are not necessarily
trained to understand the law or to apply it to specific factual situations; as lawyers, judges have had precisely this training. Executives,
despite their potential for liability, often do not have access to legal
counsel before making their decisions; there simply are not enough
lawyers in government to advise every executive on every decision that
might involve liability. 95 In contrast, judges can rely not only on their
own legal knowledge, but almost always also have access to the knowledge offered by lawyers for the parties through briefs and oral arguments. Executives often must act on the basis of hurried and informal
consultation with an agency lawyer, when a lawyer is available at all,
and events often pressure immediate decisions. The great bulk of judicial work is notorious for postponement.9 6
90. Id. at 2912. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 363-64; Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) at 347-48.
91. Davis, supra note 9, at 214.
92. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232
(1974).
93. Butz v. Economou, 98 S.Ct. at 2922 n.*.
94. See notes 2-4 and accompanying text supra.
95. See, e.g., Bershad, The Law and Corrections:A Management Pernpective,4 N. ENG.
J. ON PRISON L. 49, 65 passim (1977) [hereinafter cited as Bershad]; Davis, supranote 9, at
217.
96. Of course, judges-like executives-are often rushed in their work. See Alschuler,
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Moreover, even if all executives had the training and the access to
legal advice available to judges, the typical judicial decision would in
many ways still be more compatible with the rationales for qualifying
executive immunity. According to the traditional paradigm, 97 a judicial decision directly involves just two interests, only one of which will
prevail; the factual issues to be decided concern past events; the decision depends upon a reasoned application of largely pre-existing legal
standards supplied by earlier courts or by statute; each case is
self-contained in the sense that the facts, law and remedy for a case are
isolated from the on-going activities of the parties and others; and the
judge's responsibility is limited to passive receipt and consideration of
the facts and arguments supplied by the parties. This description is, no
doubt, inaccurate for much of modern public law litigation and is simplified even as to traditional litigation, but it is still a fair description
for generally distinguishing the stereotypical judicial process from the
executive process.
In the paradigm of the executive decision,9 8 one of two parties
does not simply "win" or "lose". Especially with elected executives,
decisions require the accommodation of many interests. The normal
executive decision involves an array of possible outcomes because the
problem is often to identify which of several methods should be used to
satisfy the competing interests. Such decisions require predictive judgments as to how organizations can be controlled and how policies can
be achieved: about the probable effects of different systems of deterrents and inducements, and of different methods of supervision, inspection and training. 9 9 Thus, although restricted by notions of legal
authority, the executive's attention must be directed at a number of
nonlegal considerations as well. Moreover, an executive decision is not
a discrete event but is a part of an on-going process. Responsibility for
decisionmaking is delegated throughout an organization." ° Different
aspects of a decision can be made sequentially-in a "stream of syntheCourtroom Misconductby Prosecutorsand TrialJudges,50 TEX. L. REV.629, 677-85 (1972).
But judges are more likely to have the option of slowing their decision-making processes for
occasional reflection.
97. See generally Chayes, The Role ofthe Judge in PublicLaw Litigation,89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281, 1282-83 (1976).
98. See generally, HART & SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (tent. ed. 1958). A classic analysis of the nature of
executive responsibilities can be found in C. BARNARD, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE
(1938) [hereinafter cited as BARNARD].
99. BARNARD, supra note 98, at 231 passim.

100. Id. at 233.
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ses"l 0 1-and decisions in any single matter are complicated by their
potential impact on matters unrelated to the immediate dispute at
hand. Finally, the executive, while dependent on others for much of
his information, actively shapes that information by structuring the administrative mechanisms that gather and evaluate information. 2
Thus, the stereotypical descriptions of executive and judicial decisions
indicate that executive decisions must accommodate a broader range of
interests, require more complicated judgments, and are less guided.
It is extremely hazardous to evaluate an executive decision. Not
only may the underlying explanation be difficult to assess because the
decision is vague or complex, but also because the executive often must
act in the absence of any preserved record. This is not to argue that
executives should be immune for acts which they knew br should have
known were unconstitutional. Rather, it is to suggest that if executives
are subject to such liability, judges should afortiori be subject to the
same liability. To the extent that the stereotypes of the judicial and
executive process no longer (or never did) conform to actual practices
because the act of judging is more "executive" than mythology admits,
the appropriate conclusion is merely that equivalent unfairness would
attend qualified judicial immunity as now attends qualified executive

immunity.
Independence, however, is thought to be centrally important to the
judicial process. Concern with personal matters, including personal liability, is thought to be incompatible with impartial attention to the
legal issues. This argument assumes that concern for personal liability
does not encourage careful attention to the merits of the dispute. But
precisely this assumption is rejected by the cases establishing qualified
executive immunity. 0 3 These cases reflect a belief that potential liability for unreasonable or knowingly unconstitutional acts will provide an
effective incentive for officials to give greater attention to constitutional
requirements. 104 Exposure to liability has thus been designed precisely
to encourage attention to legal issues. Since this concern is the central
responsibility of a judge, the major assumption underlying qualified
executive immunity indicates that imposition of limited liability on
judges would be highly compatible with their function.
Effects other than attention to constitutional requirements, however, can be expected to follow from qualifying judicial immunity. The
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 231.
Id. at 217-27.
See note 2 & 3 supra and cases cited therein.
See Yudof, supra note 24, at 1335.
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additional pressures created by exposure to liability have led to changes
in executive decisionmaking that might be expected to affect judicial
decisions as well. The increase in prisoners' rights lawsuits, for example, has greatly increased the prison administrator's reliance on the advice of his agency's attorney. 10 5 Corrections officials now devote more
attention to developing and revising explicit rules for their own operation. 0 6 And, predictably, the "increased risk of being held individually
liable . . .has made complete recordkeeping vital if the defenses of
'good-faith' or 'lack of knowledge' are to be successfully proven."1 07
Similarly, the potential liability of public school officials is said to be
leading to increased reliance on documentation and elaborate, legalistic
procedures.'0 8 Exposure to liability can also be expected to encourage
timid, noncontroversial decisions, since decisive actions, like expelling
a student, seem fraught with uncertainties and risks.' 0 9
The noticeable characteristic of these side effects of qualifying executive immunity is their similarity to normal judicial methods. It is
not surprising that those who are required to make judge-like decisions
about the law resort to a judge's procedures." 0 The judicial process
has always been dominated by attorneys' argument and judgment; by
careful attention to procedure intended to assure all parties that the
decision will be fair and deliberative; by precise recordkeeping and
written explanation that create at least apparent clarity as to the bases
of any decision; and even by caution, for the tradition of adjudication-despite dramatic examples to the contrary-is of small changes
elaborately justified and carefully chosen. This is not to suggest that all
these characteristics are necessarily destructive of the executive function, nor to argue that they are all necessarily useful in the judicial
function. Rather, the point is simply that even if such effects are
beneficial, or at least worth their costs, they are more compatible with
the normal judicial proceeding than with the normal executive action.
If these effects did not justify shielding executive decisions with absolute immunity, they certainly are not sufficient to give this additional
protection to judicial decisions.
105. Bershad, supra note 95, at 65.
106. Id. at 60.
107. Id. at 58-59.
108. Yudof, supra note 24, at 1395-99.
109. Id.
110. Indeed, "judicializing" executive decisionmaking is a way of describing one of the
objectives of qualified executive immunity. Directly requiring that executives use judicial
methods has long been proposed as an alternative to imposing liability. See Jennings, Tort
Liabiliy ofAdministrative Officers, 21 MiNN. L. Rav. 263 (1937).
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The final major argument in support of absolute judicial immunity
is that additional burdens on the judge are unnecessary or even dysfunctional because the judicial process contains safeguards providing
adequate assurance that constitutional rights will not be knowingly violated. This argument undercuts the occasional suggestion that because
adjudications involve hostile confrontations, a large number of lawsuits
against judges could be expected. The judicial process, more than the
executive, is surrounded by procedures, traditions and rituals designed
to elicit acceptance of the court's decision."' The opportunity to argue
and cross-examine, the elaborate precision of the procedures, the courtesy and respect openly extended to judge and opposing counsel, the
clothing, positioning and education of the judge, the use of juries, the
reliance on precedent, the written record, the opinion written to justify
the outcome, and the opportunity for appeal-all do at least as much to
assure consent to the outcome as to assure constitutional conduct.
These characteristics, as well as the improbability of unconstitutional
conduct itself, reduce the likelihood of an excessive number of lawsuits
against judges. The formality of the proceedings would also make it
feasible to dismiss insubstantial claims before trial.
Even if there are already sufficient assurances that the judicial
function will be exercised within constitutional limits, one of the purposes of civil rights liability is to compensate the victim.' 12 The fact
that only a small number of abuses occur is no reason to deny compensation for those that do occur. Moreover, the use of procedural protections does not assure constitutional conduct when the claim is precisely
that unconstitutional procedures have been used by a judge. Any right
of appeal in Slump, for example, was an empty promise since the sterilized woman never knew she was the subject of litigation nor that she
was to be sterilized.
The relative improbability of unconstitutional judicial conduct actually suggests that the deterrent function of qualified liability would
be more effective when applied to judges than when applied to executives. As Professor Davis has argued, the potentially enormous number
of legal abuses by some executives, especially the police, may be largely
111. See ARNOLD, supra note 1 l,passim and especially ch. VIII. For a discussion of the
sources of judicial legitimacy, see Casey, The Supreme Court andMyth, S L. & Soc'Y REv.
385 (1974) and materials cited therein; Engstrom & Giles, Expectations andImages: A Note
on Dfuse SupportforLegallnstituons,6 L. & Soc'Y REv. 631 (1972). Judges' misconduct
can undermine public acceptance of the process. See Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by
Prosecutorsand TrialJudges, 50 TEx. L. REV. 629, 680-85 (1972).
112. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253-57 (1978).
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impervious to the threat of liability." 3 The mere fact that only a fraction of the violations can possibly lead to lawsuits impedes the deterrent function. Since a larger proportion of the small number of judicial
violations might lead to lawsuits, deterrence might be more effective.
In addition, because deterrence of illegal executive conduct is diluted
by indemnification, the operative deterrent is largely nonmonetary-the disgrace or embarrassment of a finding of illegal conduct, the
interruption of regular activities due to the litigation and other career
consequences." 4 Many of these nonmonetary deterrents would be especially effective if applied to judges for the same reasons that violations are unlikely in the first place. Judges are likely to care about the
high traditions of their office, to aspire to do an effective job, and to
desire the respect of their colleagues. The education, training and acculturation of judges all point to the potential effectiveness of qualified
liability as a deterrent. Finally, the effectiveness of potential liability as
a deterrent to executive misconduct is reduced in many cases because
the malfeasor does not alone have the capability of altering his conduct.II The policeman on the street may lack the knowledge or time
consistently to alter his search and seizure practices; the institutional
administrator may be dependent on others for funding or the promulgation of necessary standards. Unconstitutional acts by judges, however, would much more likely be within their own power to prevent or
correct. A judge is not dependent on others to see that a minor is represented, a hearing provided, or a clear constitutional standard understood and followed in his decision.
The generic attributes of the judicial function do not justify a
broad rule of absolute immunity." 6 In fact, if those attributes are compared to the characteristics of the executive function, liability for unreasonable or knowing violations of constitutional rights is
considerably more appropriate for the improper exercise of the judicial
function than for the executive. Nevertheless, the branch of govern113. Davis, supra note 9 at 216-17. See also Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers:Proposals
to Strengthen the Section 1983 DamageRemedyfor Law Enforcer'sMisconduct, 87 YALE L.J.
447 (1978); Developments in the Law-Section 1983 andFederalism, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1133,
1206 (1977).
114. Yudof, supra note 24, at 1390.
115. See cases in articles cited in note 113 supra.
116. There may be, of course, specific judicial responsibilities that-like some specific
executive responsibilities-require absolute immunity. Such claims should be evaluated on
an individual basis. Cf. Butz v. Economou, 98 S. Ct. at 2910-18. Specific evaluations of
function have been done-for example, with the claim that liability for a prosecutor's decision to introduce evidence at trial would be inconsistent with the adversary system. See
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 440 (1976) (White, J., concurring).
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ment with the main capacity and responsibility for understanding and
applying the law is held immune even for knowing failures to apply the
fundamental law. Assessed by the kind of functional analysis insisted
upon by the modem Court, this is not a paradox, but an absurdity or an
evasion. The next section examines whether those reasons relied on by
the older courts, but no longer openly acknowledged, reveal more
about the underpinnings of judicial immunity.
II.

Omitted Justifications for Absolute Judicial Immunity

Only briefly, at the end of a dissenting opinion, was there any allusion in Stump v. Sparkman to a justification which had figured prominently in the history of judicial immunity. Justice Stewart noted that
the petitioner's brief referred to the "aura of deism which surrounds the
bench. . . essential to the maintenance of respect for the judicial institution."' "1 7 The modem opinions insist that official immunity must be
justified by realistic functional analysis, not by attributes of status. The
arguments based on status sound curious to the modem ear, outmoded
and even embarrassing. But they are worth examining partly because
they were relied on historically, partly because the functional arguments are so unconvincing, and partly because a moment's introspection reveals their importance. Courts have been surrounded with
special responsibilities and with special prerogatives, and they do have
special psychological significance for lawyers and citizens. Myths, superstitions and emotive symbols are commonly studied as elements of
governance; 1 8 the stolid efforts of courts and commentators to justify
immunity doctrines only in realistic terms may be submerging the more
important issues at stake.
Dignity has always been an important attribute of judicial authority. The English courts traced their ancestry to the authority of the
crown itself,1 1 9 and courts still utilize regal symbolism. Religious allusions are not uncommon when judges and commentators discuss judicial responsibilities. 20 It is doubtful that any other officials in the
117. 435 U.S. 349, 369 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
118. SeeH. TUDOR, POLITICAL MYTH (1972) and materials cited therein; Casey, The
Supreme Court and Myth, 8 L. & Soc'Y REV.385 (1974) and materials cited therein.
119. Even in the United States, this has been relied on as a reason for immunity. See
Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 536 (1869). See also materials cited in note 65
supra.
120. For instance, Learned Hand described Justice Brandeis' "almost mystic reverence
for that court whose tradition seemed to him not only to consecrate its own members, but to
impress its sacred mission upon all who shared in any measure in its work." L. HAND, THE
SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 168 (3d ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as HAND]. Thurman Arnold referred
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United States are as accustomed as judges to the exercise of peremptory
authority or to such constant shows of deference. The early American
cases concerning judicial immunity overtly linked immunity to the judiciary's special need for dignity. In Randall v. Brigham, 2 ' the Court
described the possibility of personal liability as necessarily leading to
the "degradation of the judicial authority."' 22 The Randall opinion
quoted at length from British decisions that suggested liability would
render judges "slaves . . to every sheriff, juror, attorney, and plaintiff"; it asserted, "If you once break down the barrier of their dignity,
and subject them to an action, you. . establish its weakness in a degrading responsibility."' 2 3 References to "servility" and "degradation"
recur in Randall and also appear in the other early major judicial immunity case, Bradley v. Fisher.2 4
It is noteworthy that both Randall and Bradley involved claims by
attorneys of illegal, summary disbarment by a judge. In Bradley, the
Court assumed that summary action was improper, but found it to be a
"judicial" act because the attorney had "threatened the presiding justice . . . with personal chastisement."' 25 The Court noted that "[a]
greater indignity could hardly be offered to a judge" and that without
firm reaction the judge "would soon find himself a subject of pity
rather than of respect."' 2 6 Thus in the early judicial immunity cases,
the need to maintain the dignity of the court was relevant to establishing the "judicial" nature of the act, but the illegality of the judge's action was not so treated. Protection of the court's authority, more than
protection of the rule of law, was seen as the defining characteristic of a
"judicial" action.
One key to judicial dignity has always been impersonality. Judicial opinions, as well as academic comment on them,1 27 strive to elimito the courts' "priestly power." ARNOLD, supra note 11, at 186. See also Casey, The
Supreme Court and Myth, 8 L. & Soc'y REv. 385 (1974).
121. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523 (1869).
122. Id. at 536.
123. Id. at 537-38.
124. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347-49 (1872).
125. Id. at 356.
126. Id.
127. The efforts by legal scholars to deal objectively with the reasons given by courts for
their decisions need no citation since the great bulk of legal literature, even critical literature,
is impersonal. No doubt, this approach is constructive, and the point here is merely to note
how deeply impersonality is imbedded in legal traditions and norms. The most famous
illustration is probably Wechsler, TowardNeutralPrincolesof ConstitutionalLaw,73 HARv.
L. Rnv. 1 (1959).
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nate the judge's personality as a factor in the outcome. As Learned
Hand observed:
[The judge's] authority. . . depend[s] upon the assumption that
he speaks with the mouth of others: the momentum of his utterances must be greater than any which his personal reputation and
character can command, if.. .it is to stand against the passionate resentments arising out of the interests he must frustrate. He
must pose as a kind of oracle, voicing the dictates of vague divinity-a communion which reaches far beyond the memory of any
and has gathered up a prestige beyond that of any
now living, 128
single man.
Qualified immunity would especially threaten the impersonality and,
therefore, the dignity of the judge. Inquiries into what the judge knew
or should have known examine the judge as a person. His knowledge
and motives must be exposed. This stands in sharp contrast to the challenges to judicial authority that are now permitted. In an appeal, a
lower court is alleged to have erred, but normally the error is not examined from the perspective of what the judge below should have
known or whether his mistake was justifiable; rather, the issue is the
law, not the judge. Similarly, a judge can be liable if he acts in the
clear absence of jurisdiction or in a nonjudicial capacity.1 9 In such
cases, the judge is examined as a person but, by definition, only after he
has been removed from the domain of judicial authority. Even arguments that the scope of judicial liability should be expanded sometimes
rely on the sleight-of-hand that makes a fallible judge not a judge. The
intention to deprive a person of his civil rights is said to be "wholly
incompatible with the judicial function," and a judge who has acted
with this intention is described as acting not "as a judge, but as a 'minister' of his own prejudices."' 3 ° Absolute judicial immunity, then, like
many judicial practices, serves to preserve the impersonality and dignity of the judge's authority.
Essentialness has been a second important aspect of judicial authority. From the earliest Supreme Court decisions, the judicial power
has been equated with the existence of the constitutional order itself. 3 '
128. HAND, supra note 120, at 130.
129. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 355-57.
130. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 567 n.6 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
131. If courts were required to give effect to legislation that, in their opinion, was unconstitutional, the Constitution, established "in theory," would be overthrown "in fact." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). The Court has even equated the
judicial process with the constitutional order in a case requiring obedience to an injunction
that probably violated the First Amendment: "But respect for judicial process is a small
price to pay for the civilizing hand of law, which alone can give abiding meaning to constitutional freedom." Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S; 307, 321 (1967).
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Judicial authority is often described as fragile and threats to judicial
authority are couched in catastrophic terms. For example, words that
threaten or demean a judge-a daily fact of life for many executives
and legislators-have been described as incompatible with "the judicial
132
Alindependence so indispensable to the administration of justice."'
though the threat to authority was an isolated incident, the danger was
cast in systemic terms:
[A]n enormity of the sort, practiced but on a single judge, would
be an offence as much against the court, which is bound to protect all its members, as if it had been repeated on the person of
each of them, because the consequences to suitors and the public
would be the same ....
Similarly, grand themes were elicited by the possibility that a state
court might try a federal marshall for a murder allegedly committed
while protecting a federal judge from assassination: "The general government must cease to exist whenever it loses the power of protecting
itself ....,,134 No doubt, the courts have sometimes exaggerated the
danger inherent in challenges to the other branches of government.
But the persistent tone of catastrophe associated with threats to judicial
authority can be contrasted with detached assessments of dangers involving the authority of the executive and legislative branches. For example, with the scope of the executive power in question, the Court
calmly found "the administration of justice" not to be endangered by
disorders created during the Civil War' 35 and the power of the general
be implicated by a nation-wide steel
government to protect itself not 3to
6
1
War.
Korean
the
during
strike
Predictably, disaster has been found in the possibility of qualified
judicial immunity. The Court has resisted qualifying judicial immunity by suggesting that it would expose judges to lawsuits from "every
'
In contrast, despite a huge
one who might feel himself aggrieved."137
increase in the actual number of challenges to executive authority, the
Court has remained detached enough to see the countervailing benefits,
and has expanded the range of executives who might be subject to civil
rights liability.138 In addition, judicial immunity for knowingly uncon132. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 356.
133. Id.
134. In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 61 (1890) (quoting Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I
Wheat.) 304, 363 (1816)).
135. Exparte MiUlligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1867).
136. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
137. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 347 (emphasis added). See also cases cited
in note 90 supra.
138. See cases cited in note 3 supra. See also Butz v. Economou, 98 S.Ct. at 2910-12
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stitutional acts continues to be linked to grave considerations such as
"the proper administration of justice."' 3 9 The judicial decision is still
easily undermined by the faintest trace
pictured as delicate and painful,
40

of personal consideration.1

Finality has been a third attribute of judicial authority. Since Marbury v. Madison,1 4 ' the Supreme Court has aggressively extended its

role as the final arbiter of almost all constitutional questions. 142 Partly
because a judicial decision is the final recourse for defining the law,
defiance of the judiciary has been viewed as less tolerable than defiance

of other authority. For example, a statute or administrative ruling can
be challenged by disobedience and the legality of the defiance can be
finally determined in a court; however, if an injunction is disobeyed,

the defiant party normally is subject to punishment even if he can
demonstrate that the order was illegal. 143 The psychological impulse

that rejects any possibility of legitimate challenge to authority that is
temporally final is reflected, perhaps, also in the extraordinary powers
that federal courts have employed while enforcing their decrees against
unresponsive governments or populations.'" The impulse is under-

standable. If "final" authority can be challenged, then it is not final;
surely, society cannot operate on the basis of an infinite regress of challenges. Moreover, because the decisions of the courts are effectively the

law no matter how patently inconsistent with the written constitution,
(threat of numerous lawsuits against executives is dismissed on the grounds that "insubstantial lawsuits can be quickly terminated by federal courts").
139. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 363 (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
335, 347 (1871)).140. Id See also note 87 supra.
141. 5 U.S. (ICranch) 137 (1803).
142. See, e.g., cases cited in note 1 supra; United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974);
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
143. This is true even if the defiance precedes a successful appeal, Worden v. Searls, 121
U.S. 14 (1887), and even if the injunction was issued pursuant to an unconstitutional statute,
United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 293 (1947); Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S.
181, 189-90 (1922). As to whether defiance is punishable if the issuing court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction, compare United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 293
(1947) and Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 315 (1967) (both suggesting that
subject matter jurisdiction might be a prerequisite) with Dobbs, The Validation of Void Judgments: The BootstrapPrinciple, 53 VA. L. REv. 1003, 1020 (1967) (suggesting that there was
no subject matter jurisdiction, in the normal sense, in United Mine Workers). As to instances where defiance might not be punishable, see Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388
U.S. at 315-19.
144. For descriptions of such powers, see Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law
Litigation, 89 HARV. L. Rnv. 1281 (1976); Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of
FederalEquitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. Rv.661, 661 n.2 (1978); Comment, Community
Resistanceto School Desegregation:Enjoiningthe Undefnable Class, 44 U. CHI. L. RFv.111
(1976).
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there is a strong incentive to believe the decisions are correct. 145 Psyopinions are not final because infallible but infalchologically, judicial
146
lible because final.
The attribute of finality has also been reflected in the judicial immunity cases. Both English and American courts have relied on the
argument that "if the judicial matters of record should be drawn in
question. . . there never will be an end of causes but controversies will
be infinite."' 4 7 Immunity not only cuts off challenges to judicial authority but also serves the psychological correlates of finality. Absolute
judicial immunity treats judges as if they were infallible, in the sense
that their errors are treated as legally insignificant. More importantly,
the urge to believe that the final authority is infallible is served by
preventing inquiries into motive and knowledge. A finding that a
judge was not only wrong but also venal would painfully emphasize the
eventual unavoidability of imperfect, even unjust authority. In this
foolish
sense, the action of a court cannot be considered corrupt 14or
8
"without seeming to endanger the very fabric of the state."
These justifications for absolute judicial immunity omitted by the
modem Court are, of course, a description of the classical idea of sovereignty. The long history of attempting to embody sovereignty by investing rulers with extraordinary dignity through the use of various
symbols of power is well known. The pomp, ritual and religious overtones of Roman emperors and British kings find a faded reflection in
some of the customs and rhetoric that surround the modem judiciary. 14 9 Theories of sovereignty were developed against the background
of political disorder in sixteenth century France, and a major objective
145. Many scholars come only reluctantly to the conclusion that the Court has acted
unconstitutionally, or strive to justify other ways of describing departures from the written
document. See L. LuSKY, BY WHAT RIGHT?. (1975); Compare Ely, The Wages of Crying
Wof .4 Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L. J. 920 (1973) and Grey, Do We Have an
Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703 (1975) with R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY
JUDICIARY (1977).
146. The reference, of course, is to Justice Jackson's famous line in Brown v. Allen, 344
U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (concurring opinion). Cf. L. FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE
DISSONANCE (1957).
147. Floyd v. Barker, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305, 1306 (1608); see Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 335, 349 (1871).
148. ARNOLD, supra note 11, at 129.
149. See generaly I THE GREAT POLITICAL THEORIES FROM PLATO AND ARISTOTLE TO
LOCKE AND MONTESQUIEU 117, 270 (M. Curtis ed. 1961). Hobbes argued: "And as the
power, so also the honour of the sovereign, ought to be greater, than that of any, or all the
subjects. For in the sovereignty is the fountain of honour. The dignities of lord, earl, duke,
and prince are his creatures. As in the presence of the master, the servants are equal, and
without any honour at all; so are the subjects, in the presence of the sovereign." Id. at 311.
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of the theorists was to justify a degree of power and loyalty thought
essential to order and the rule of law. 5 ' Hobbes, for example, described the sovereign as "the soul of the commonwealth; which failing,
the commonwealth is dissolved into a civil war, no one man so much as

cohering to another, for want of a common dependence on a known
sovereign."'' Anarchy is the blunt word for the more muted intimations of catastrophe that the courts so often suggest when their author-

ity is threatened. Finally, the tautology that the final authority must be
beyond challenge was the crucial argument of early theorists of sovereignty.'15 The consequent paradox that the embodiment of the highest
legal authority must be above the law is echoed in the freedom of mod-

em judges from personal liability for knowingly unconstitutional acts.
Modem commentators do not insist, as Blackstone did with respect to
the king, that a judge is "'incapable of doing wrong. . . even of thinkYet a lawsuit that
ing wrong. . . ;in him is no folly or weakness.' "'""
is
nevertheless foreor
weakness
folly
of
a
judge's
issue
would make an
closed by the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity.

No matter how psychologically compelling, the omitted justifications themselves do not necessarily support the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity. Dignity and respect can be achieved in a number of
ways, and one of the most appropriate would be visibly to subordinate
judges' behavior to the Constitution by qualifying judicial immunity.
Surely, dignity is not unambigiously achieved by a doctrine, like abso-

lute immunity, apparently prompted by self-interest. The essential role
of the courts in maintaining a system of law is undermined, not promoted, by putting judges above the fundamental law. Qualifying im150. Id. at 269.
151. Id. at 315.
152. Bodin argued: "[I]t is the distinguishing mark of the sovereign that he cannot in any
way be subject to the commands of another, for it is he who makes law. . . . No one who is
subject. . . to the law. . . can do this. That is why it is laid down in the civil law that the
prince is above the law. . . . If the prince is not bound by the laws of his predecessors, still
less can he be bound by his own laws. One may be subject to laws made by another, but it is
impossible to bind oneself in any matter which is the subject of one's own free exercise of
will. . . ." Id. at 274. See also id. at 272-81. Hobbes, too, argued that the final source of
law could not be subject to law: "[The sovereign's] power cannot, without his consent, be
transferred to another: he cannot forfeit it: he cannot be accused by any of his subjects, of
injury: he cannot be punished by them: he is.. .judge of doctrines: he is sole legislator and
supreme judge of controversies . ...
The sovereign of a commonwealth, be it an assembly, or one man, is not subject to the civil
laws. For having power to make, and repeal laws, he may when he pleaseth, free himself
from that subjection .... " Id. at 312-13.
153. H. LASKI, FOUNDATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY 103 (1931).
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munity would be consistent with careful attention to the law; it would
help deter the occasional excess. The temporal finality of judges' decisions is a further reason for qualifying judicial immunity. Irresponsible
legislative acts can often be tempered by wise executive implementation and judicial interpretation; executive excesses can often be corrected by new legislation or judicial oversight. But to the extent that
judicial decisions are not subject to revision outside the judicial system,
it is important that a judge have effective incentives to act responsibly.
The omitted justifications are inconsistent with qualified judicial immunity only to the extent that the judiciary embodies "sovereignty" in
its fullest sense: to the extent that the sovereign must be above the law.

Conclusion
Although sovereignty can be described as an abstract attribute of a
legal system, 154 pressure always exists to locate the "final power in the
community. . . at some point within the institutional structure."1 55 In.
its history and its justifications, official immunity has always been a
means of creating "some visible wielder of sovereignty."1 56 The special
status of judges with respect to civil rights liability suggests that the
judiciary, more than the other branches of government, now serves this
function in American society.
The Court's omission of any reference to the idea of sovereignty in
its recent decsions concerning judicial immunity is not surprising in
light of the general decline in the acceptability of the idea itself. As
Harold Laski argued:
If our King fails to suit us we behead or replace him; if our ministry loses its hold, the result is registered in the ballot boxes. But
the categories of law have obstinately and needlessly resisted
such transformation . . . .[The classic theory of sovereignty] is
legally unnecessary and morally inadequate. It is legally unnecessary because, in fact, no sovereignty. . . is weakened by living
the life of the law. It is morally inadequate because it exalts authority over justice.I" 7
Such arguments have prevailed, and the Supreme Court's decisions on
executive and legislative immunity have contributed to the general decline of the idea of sovereignty. As the Court has itself emphasized:
"No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer
of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All officers of
154. See, e.g., Pennock, Law and Sovereignty, 31 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 617 (1937).
155.

H. LASKI, FOUNDATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY 12 (1931).

156. Id.
157. Id. at 136-37.
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the government, from the highest to the least, are creatures of the law,
and are bound to obey it.' ' 15 8 Given the extent to which the judiciary
has come to expound and even to represent the rule of law, it would be
surprising indeed if the Court were explicitly to justify its immunity on
the basis of a doctrine tied so closely to the desirability of some ruler
being above the law.' 5 9
The special status of the judicial function is perversely and somewhat disturbingly understandable in light of the decline of the idea of
sovereignty. The psychological promises of sovereignty are cohesion,
finality and infallibility. The comfort that these can provide becomes
increasingly irresistible as challenges to authority become more pervasive. In the United States, it has often been the judiciary that has responded to, justified, and therefore elicited such challenges. The
implication of the modem Court's insistent retention of the doctrine of
absolute judicial immunity, then, is that while the judiciary attempts to
prevent lawlessness in other institutions, it creates pressures for tolerating lawlessness in itself.

158. Butz v. Economou, 98 S. Ct. at 2910-12. See generally cases cited in note 3 supra.
159. See note 152 supra.

